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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOSHUA EARL,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020821-CA

:

INTRODUCTION
The State argues the trial court correctly denied Joshua Earl's (Earl) motion to
suppress because Earl did not have standing to challenge the search of the apartment or
backpack and the search of Earl's backpack was justified as a search incident to arrest.
See Aple. Brf. at 8, 13. However, the State's arguments fail because: (A) Earl had
standing to challenge the legality of the search under the Fourth Amendment, and (B) the
evidence seized incident to arrest was inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree.1
1

The State does not challenge several of Earl's claims. First, the State does not
challenge Earl's claim that Sheila Gledhill (Gledhill) did not have actual or apparent
authority to consent to the entry or search of the apartment. See Aplt. Brf. at 13; Aple.
Brf. at 8. Accordingly, the State does not challenge Earl's argument that the officers
entered the apartment illegally. See id Second, although the State challenges Earl's
claim that the evidence was not admissible under the plain view doctrine, it offers no
analysis or case law to support this challenge. See Aplt. Brf. at 24; Aple. Brf. at 8, 13;
see also Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. Inc.. 2003 UT 23,f46, 473 Utah Adv.
Rep. 50 (noting the appellate courts "are not a depository in which [a party] may dump
the burden of argument and research" (quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in
original)). Third, the State does not challenge Earl's assertion that there were no exigent

ARGUMENT
A,

EARL HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THE
SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The State argues Earl does not have standing to challenge the legality of the

search under the Fourth Amendment. See. Aple. Brf. at 13. However, the State's
argument fails because: (1) Earl had standing as a resident or overnight guest; (2) even if
Earl was not a resident or overnight guest, he still had standing as a social guest of the
lessee; and (3) at the very least, Earl had standing to challenge the search of the backpack
because he was its owner.
1.

Earl Has Standing to Challenge the Search Because He Was a Resident or
Overnight Guest.
The State argues the trial court correctly found Earl did not have standing as a

resident or overnight guest because he did not present enough evidence to meet his
"heavy burden" and the State rebutted the evidence he did present. Aple. Brf. at 14.
However, Earl's uncontradicted testimony that he was a resident or overnight guest at the
apartment was sufficient to establish standing under the Fourth Amendment.
Although it is the fact finder's "prerogative to determine the weight to be given
the testimony of witnesses," the fact finder "may not arbitrarily disregard competent,
credible and uncontradicted testimony." Aagard v. Dayton & Miller Red-E-Mix
Concrete Co.. 12 Utah 2d 34, 361 P.2d 522, 524 (Utah 1961) (determining trial court
circumstances to justify the warrantless search of the apartment. See. Aplt. Brf. at 46;
Aple. Brf. at 8.
2

was not "arbitrary or unreasonable in refusing to believe" a witness whose testimony was
uncontradicted because it was "fraught with . . . frailties"); see also Sonnentheil v.
Christian Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401, 408 (1899) (noting "jury had no right to
arbitrarily disregard the positive testimony of unimpeached and uncontradicted
witnesses"); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 254 (Utah 1985)
(holding "trial court's refusal to give any consideration to the uncontradicted expert
testimony of the engineer . . . constituted an abuse of discretion"); Miller v. Columbia
Trust Co., 63 Utah 305, 225 P. 609, 611 (Utah 1924) (holding "trial court was not bound
to give . . . full credence" to uncontradicted witness's testimony "on account of numerous
omissions, uncertainties, and contradictions").
Specifically, a fact finder "is not 'at liberty, under the guise of passing upon the
credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony, when from no reasonable point of
view is it open to doubt.'" Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 75 (1 st
Cir. 2002) (quoting Chesapeake & O. Rv. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216 (1931)); see.
also Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Rv. Co. v. Howell, 401 F.2d 752, 754 (10th Cir. 1968)
(holding "testimony concerning a simple fact, capable of contradiction, not incredible,
and standing uncontradicted, unimpeached, or in no way discredited by crossexamination, must be permitted to stand"). In other words, although a fact finder may
"reject testimony that is uncontradicted and unimpeached" when "credibility is at issue,"
it may only do so when the testimony is "improbable, inherently contradictory, riddled

3

with omissions, or delivered in a manner giving rise to doubts." Quintana-Ruiz . 303
F.3d at 75-76.
In this case, Earl presented sufficient evidence to establish himself as a resident or
overnight guest at Jeremy Allen's (Allen) apartment. He testified that Allen was his
stepbrother and friend. See R. 278:58. He also testified that he had been living with
Allen since the beginning of October because Allen had given him permission to live
there until he found another place to stay. See. id. at 58, 61. Finally, he testified that he
kept his clothes in the bedroom closet and, although he did not pay rent, helped clean and
buy groceries. See id. at 61.
Although this testimony was not contradicted by any other witnesses or evidence
presented at trial,2 the trial court found the testimony was not credible and provided no
reasons for its finding. See. R. 129. The only reason that can be gleaned from the record
is that the trial court rejected Earl's testimony because Earl was the defendant and had an
interest in testifying as he did. However, a fact finder cannot reject a defendant's
credibility based solely on the fact that he stands accused of a crime. See. State v. Kohl,
2000 UT 35,^21 n. 4, 999 P.2d 7 ("A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is a
2

The State argues Earl's testimony was contradicted by Gledhill's testimony that
only Allen had permission to live at the apartment and that she called the police because
she was afraid other men might be in the apartment. See. Aple. Brf at 15. However,
Gledhill also testified that she only visited the apartment occasionally and she had given
Allen permission to have visitors. See. R. 278:9, 19. Further, she clarified that she asked
the police to accompany her not because she was afraid the other men in the apartment
were present without her permission, but because she was afraid the other men in the
apartment would threaten or harm her if she entered alone. See. idL at 19-20.
4

fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the presumption of
innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair
trial under our system of criminal justice." (Quotations and citations omitted)).
2.

Even If Earl Was Not a Resident or Overnight Guest, He Still Has Standing
As a Social Guest of the Lessee.
The State argues that Earl does not have standing as Allen's social guest because

he "was merely a casual visitor." Aple. Brf. at 16-17. This argument fails because Earl
was a social guest entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
It is true, as the State claims, that the United States Supreme Court created a
continuum of Fourth Amendment standing in Minnesota v. Carter. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).3
See Aple. Brf. at 16. However, the State incorrectly applies Carter to the facts of this
case. When determining where a case lies on the Carter spectrum, a court should
consider whether the defendant had "a previous relationship with" the householder,
whether there was "any other purpose to [the defendant's] visit" besides business, and
whether the defendant enjoyed "a degree of acceptance into the household." Carter, 525

3

On one end of the spectrum is a person who obviously has standing because he
was an overnight guest. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (citing
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990) (holding defendant's status as overnight
guest was sufficient to show legitimate expectation of privacy)). On the other end of the
spectrum is a person who does not have standing because he is "merely present with the
consent of the householder." Carter, 525 U.S. at 90. Although the facts of Carter fell
"somewhere in between," the Supreme Court concluded the facts were nearer the "merely
present" pole because the defendants' business at the apartment was "purely
commercial," the defendants were only at the apartment a short time, and the defendants
had no "previous connection" with the householder. Id. at 91.
5

U.S. at 90.
For example, in United States v. Heath. 259 F.3d 522, 533 (6th Cir. 2001), the
appellate court found standing because the defendant had a previous relationship with the
householder since he was the householder's cousin, and he had acceptance in the
household because he slept on the couch as much as once a week for two years and
possessed a key. Similarly, in United States v. Cross. No. 01-20020, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23363, at *19 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 12, 2001), the court found standing even though
the defendant did not store belongings at the residence and only stayed overnight
occasionally because he had a previous relationship with the apartment owner through
familial ties and he had acceptance into the household since he was allowed to use the
common facilities at the apartment complex.4
In this case, Earl established standing because he presented evidence to show he
had a previous relationship with Allen, he had a purpose in visiting Allen besides
business, and he had a degree of acceptance into the household. First, Earl presented
evidence that he had a previous relationship with Allen. Allen and Earl were

4

Although State v.Rowe. 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), was decided before Carter, it applies factors
seemingly identical to the factors applied in Carter to determine whether a defendant has
standing. In Rowe, the Utah Court of Appeals found standing because the defendant had
stayed overnight in the past and "felt secure enough in the home to remove her shoes,
leave her purse beyond her view, and roam to rooms other than where her fellow guests
were playing cards." Rowe, 806 P.2d at 735-36. Accordingly, although the State argues
that Rowe's authority is "tenuous" because it was reversed on other grounds, Rowe/s
authority has actually been strengthened by Carter and cases interpreting Carter.
6

stepbrothers and friends. See. R. 278:19, 58. They were close enough that, when officers
entered the apartment before 8:00 a.m., Allen and Earl were sitting at the kitchen table
together playing computer games. See idL at 14-15, 20-21, 27-29. Second, Earl
presented evidence that he had a purpose in visiting Allen besides business. When
officers entered the apartment, Earl and Allen were not engaging in any business
transactions. See idL Instead, they were sitting at the kitchen table playing video games
as any friends or stepbrothers would do. See. id. Third, Earl presented evidence to show
he had a degree of acceptance in the household. Earl was welcome in the apartment
during the early morning hours and felt comfortable enough to leave his backpack on the
floor in a different room of the apartment while he played video games in the kitchen.
See id at 14-15, 20-21, 22, 27-29.
Furthermore, the State fails to consider Carter's plurality in its argument. In
Carter, Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Breyer excepted from the majority opinion
because they believed short-term guests were entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
Carter, 525 U.S. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment), 106 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, "the majority opinion depended on the concurrence of Justice
Kennedy, who joined the opinion expressly because its reasoning' was 'consistent with
[his] view that almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and
hence protection against unreasonable searches, in their host's home.'"5 Morton v.
5

Justice Kennedy concurred because, under the facts presented, the defendants
"established no meaningful tie or connection to the owner, the owner's home, or the
7

United States. 734 A.2d 178, 180 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Carter. 525 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy,
J., concurring)) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, when using Carter to determine
standing, it is important to read the plurality because "five Members of the Court would
place under the Fourth Amendment's shield, at least, 'almost all social guests."1 Carter.
525 U.S. at 109 n. 2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Carter. 525 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy,
J., concurring)): see also United States v. Higgins. 282 F.3d 1261, 1271 (10th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that Carter must be analyzed in light of Justice Kennedy's concurrence
where he concluded that nonovernight, social guests generally have a legitimate
expectation of privacy); InreB.R.K.. 658 N.W.2d 565, 575 (Minn. 2003) (noting that
courts must consider Justice Kennedy's concurrence because it was ,fthe deciding vote11);
State v. Ortiz. 618 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Iowa 2000) ("In deciding the present case, we must
be mindful of [Justice Kennedy's] concurring opinion, as well as the plurality opinion,
because, without Justice Kennedy's concurrence, the Court's finding of no reasonable
expectation of privacy would not have prevailed."). Thus, under Carter 's plurality, Earl's
standing under the Fourth Amendment is even stronger because most, if not all, social
guests have standing.
3.

At the Very Least, Earl Has Standing To Challenge the Search of the
Backpack Because He Owned the Backpack.
The State argues the officers were justified in searching Earl's backpack without a

owner's expectation of privacy." Minnesota v. Carter. 525 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
8

warrant because Earl "manifested] no expectation of privacy in the backpack" and the
officers had Allen's consent to search the apartment. Aple. Brf. at 18. However, these
arguments fail because Earl did manifest an expectation of privacy in the backpack.
First, the State claims Earl manifested no expectation of privacy because he left
the backpack in the livingroom. See. Aple. Brf. at 18. To support this argument, the
State cites United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1989), for the idea
that an expectation of privacy is tenuous in the common areas of an apartment. See id.
However, Burnett is distinguishable from this case. In Burnett, the defendant was a
casual visitor who left drugs in an open bag that did not belong to him in the hallway
while he was in the bedroom. See. Burnett, 890 F.2d at 1238-39. Conversely, in this
case, Earl was not a casual visitor but an overnight or social guest. See Sections A(l)-(2)
above. Further, he was the backpack's sole owner, was careful to keep it closed, and did
not leave it unattended with his other belongings but brought it to the livingroom where
he could keep an eye on it from the kitchen. See. R. 278:22, 61.
Second, the State claims Earl manifested no expectation of privacy in the
backpack because he denied ownership of the backpack. See Aple. Brf. at 19. However,
Earl did not deny ownership of the backpack until after the backpack had been searched.
See R. 277:13. Earl was never given the opportunity to claim ownership of the backpack
before it was searched. See R. 278:59. Rather, he was given the opportunity after the
officers searched the backpack, found paraphernalia, and mirandized him so he knew

9

claiming ownership would only provide the State evidence with which to convict him.
See R. 278:36: 277:13: see also United States v. Garzon. 119 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (10 th
Cir. 1997) (holding defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in bag, even though
he left it on bus, because he was not given opportunity to claim ownership before
search).
Third, the State claims Earl did not manifest an expectation of privacy because he
did not assert ownership of the backpack when the officers asked Allen for consent to
search the apartment. See Aple. Brf. at 18-19. However, contrary to the State's
assertion, it is not reasonable to assume Earl heard the officers ask Allen for consent.
See id. at 19 n. 11. There is no evidence in the record to show Earl was present when the
officers asked Allen for consent and, absent evidence to support this assertion, it cannot
be assumed simply because the men present in the apartment were ordered out of the
apartment at the same time. See, e.g., Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial
Comm'n. 744 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah 1987) (holding "it cannot be assumed that facts
exist1' in the absence of evidence).
B.

THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE BACKPACK DURING THE
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST WAS INADMISSIBLE FRUIT OF THE
POISONOUS TREE
The State argues this Court should affirm the trial court's holding that the search

of Earl's backpack was a valid search incident to arrest because the issue was not
preserved for appeal and the officers were justified in searching Earl's backpack incident

10

to arrest. See Aple. Brf. at 8, 11. However, the State's argument fails because: (1) the
issue was properly preserved for appeal, and (2) the evidence seized incident to arrest
was inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree because it was tainted by the illegal entry.
1.

This Issue Was Properly Preserved for Appeal.
The State argues this Court should not consider whether the evidence seized from

Earl's backpack during the search incident to arrest was inadmissible fruit of the
poisonous tree because the issue was not preserved for appeal. See Aple. Brf. at 11.
However, this argument fails because Earl did properly preserve the issue. See State v.
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460 (Utah 1994) (holding Msome form of specific preservation of
claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will
review such a claim on appeal" (quotations and citation omitted)); Ray v. State, 798 So.
2d 579 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (holding defendant's argument that officer exceeded
authority of search incident to arrest was preserved, even though defendant did not
specifically discuss in motion to suppress, because motion "covered all of the contraband
that was discovered in the search").
Here, Earl moved the trial court to suppress all evidence seized at the apartment.
See R. 33. In arguing the motion, both parties discussed whether the officers were
justified in searching Earl's backpack incident to arrest. See id. at 46, 65. Specifically,
Earl argued the search incident to arrest was unlawful because, "[otherwise, police could
always search homes without warrants, arrest people inside if they found any evidence of

11

crimes, and then continue searching 'incident to arrest.'" R. at 65-66. After considering
these arguments, the trial court denied Earl's motion because, among other things, the
search of Earl's backpack was "lawful incident to his arrest." See_ id. at 132.
Accordingly, Earl pleaded guilty and reserved "his right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress." See id at 235.6
2.

The Search of EaiTs Backpack Should Be Excluded As Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree Because It Was Achieved Through Illegal Entry.
The State argues this Court should reject Earl's argument that the reasonableness

of an officer's search incident to arrest should be considered when the arrest and search
are achieved through illegal entry because it was already rejected in United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and it would not further the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule. See Aple. Brf. at 11-13. However, this Court should apply a
reasonableness test to searches incident to arrest when the arrest was obtained through
illegal entry because: (1) Robinson is inapplicable, and (2) a reasonableness test will
achieve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.
First, Robinson is not applicable because it does not address how the taint of a
6

In this case, neither of the policy reasons for requiring preservation apply.
Preservation is required because: (1) "the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and (2) "a defendant should not be
permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing] the defendant's
chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,... claiming] on appeal that the Court
should reverse." State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 14^11, 10 P.3d 346 (quotations and
citations omitted) (alterations in original). Here, Earl readily brought the issue to the trial
court's attention and the trial court considered and addressed the claimed error. See R.
46,65,132.
12

prior illegality affects searches incident to arrest. In Robinson, the Court held no
reasonableness test is required when deciding whether a search incident to arrest is valid.
Robinson. 414 U.S. at 234-35. However, it did not address whether a reasonableness test
is required when the search incident to arrest is tainted by prior illegality. In this case,
Earl does not argue the search incident to arrest was invalid under Robinson . Rather, he
argues the evidence seized during the search should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous
tree because the search was tainted by the illegal entry and was not so reasonable as to
cure the taint. Accordingly, Robinson is not applicable.
Second, this Court should use a reasonableness test to determine the effect a prior
illegality has on searches incident to arrest because a reasonableness test would deter
police illegality.7 An intervening criminal act permits an officer who illegally enters a
premises to arrest a defendant. See State v. Griego. 933 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah Ct. App.
1997). However, it does not automatically terminate the applicability of the exclusionary
rule that attached at the illegal entry. See State v. Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289, 292
(Utah 1995) (determining an intervening act nullifies the exclusionary rule only if
"excluding the evidence will [not] effectively deter future illegalities"). Rather, the

7

This issue has not yet been addressed in Utah. The State argues the Utah
Supreme Court chose not to adopt a reasonableness test where the search incident to
arrest follows an illegality in State v. Trane. 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d 1052. See. Aple. Brf.
at 12 n. 8. However, in Trane, the parties did not argue a reasonableness requirement
should be imposed and there was no need for the Court to consider it because the search
incident to arrest was obviously reasonable since the defendant confronted the officers
with threats and physical violence. See Trane, 2002 UT 97 atffl[4-9,22 n. 3.
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exclusionary rule will continue to apply until "the detrimental consequences of illegal
police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no
longer justifies its cost." Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
In the case of a search incident to arrest, the exclusionary consequence of prior
illegality ceases to deter, not when the officer is rewarded for his illegal actions by
obtaining a lawful arrest, but when he develops a reasonable fear of danger or destruction
of evidence that justifies a search incident to that arrest.8 Cf. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d
460, 470 (Utah 1990) (holding officers are justified in searching without a warrant when
necessary to "protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction of
evidence"); State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The need for an
immediate search must be apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh the
important protection of individual rights provided by the warrant requirement.").

8

A reasonableness test would also serve other purposes of the exclusionary rule.
One purpose of the exclusionary rule is to "prevent making a court a 'party to lawless
invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental
use of the fruits of such invasions.'" State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990)
(citation omitted). Allowing trial courts to use a reasonableness test to decide whether a
search incident to arrest was conducted to dispel fear or to abuse a prior illegality would
prevent them from becoming accomplices to governmental illegality.
Another purpose of the exclusionary rule is assure citizens "that the government
w[ill] not profit from its lawless behavior." United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 357
(1974) (Brennan, J. dissenting). Allowing a trial court to consider reasonableness would
assure the public that the government does not automatically use evidence seized through
illegality, but only uses evidence if it was reasonably seized for fear of safety or
destruction of evidence.
14

Further, although the State argues a reasonableness test would not deter police
illegality because it is "highly improbable" an officer "would act illegally in the hope that
a suspect would commit an intervening offense," Aple. Brf. at 12-13, a reasonableness
test would deter illegality because there are several simple ways an officer can secure a
lawful arrest after illegally gaining access to a person.9
For example, after illegally gaining access to a person, an officer can leam the
identity of the person and arrest him for outstanding warrants. See, e.g.. Frierson v.
State. No. 4D02-1875, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 8291, at *20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 4,
2003) (holding search incident to arrest for outstanding warrants invalid because officer
illegally stopped defendant); State v. Ford. 778 N.E.2d 642, 680 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)
(same); State v. DeArman. 774 P.2d 1247, 1249-50 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (same).
Similarly, after illegally gaining access to a person, an officer can ask him about
identification and arrest him for lying about or failing to carry identification. See, e.g..
Vollmer v. State. 337 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding search
incident to arrest for lying about name invalid because officer illegally stopped
defendant); State v. Gagnon. 817 So. 2d 167, 171 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (holding search
incident to arrest for driving without valid driver's license invalid because officer

9

There are also many rewards for obtaining an arrest if the officer is then allowed
to search without reasonable fear because the authority granted in a search incident to
arrest is very broad. See, e.g.. State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 784-85 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (holding bag search after defendant handcuffed and placed in patrol car was valid).
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illegally stopped defendant).10 In other words,
if evidence is not excluded when it is found as a result of an
arrest that is, itself, at least triggered by . . . an unlawful
search and seizure, then police have open season, limited only
by the prospect of civil suits for civil rights violations, to
conduct sweeps, stopping dozens, or hundreds, of persons,
without any particularized suspicion, in the hope of catching
a few persons who are subject to outstanding arrest warrants
[or who commit intervening crimes in response to the
officer's illegal action].
Ford. 778 N.E.2d at 680.
In this case, the search incident to arrest was conducted without a reasonable fear
of danger or destruction of evidence. See. Aplt. Brf. at 44-46. Accordingly, the evidence
seized from Earl's backpack in the search incident to arrest should be excluded as fruit of
the poisonous tree because his arrest was achieved through illegality and the incident
search was not reasonable so as to sever the exclusionary effect of the illegal entry.

10

Notably, each of the cases cited here involve illegal stops outside the home.
Whereas, in this case, the officers illegally entered a private residence. Illegally entering
a home is a much greater intrusion than illegally stopping a person on the street. See,
e.g.. State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (explaining that "a person has a
lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home"); State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d
1, 432 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1967) (noting the core of the Fourth Amendment is "the right of
a man to retreat into his home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion"). Accordingly, as evidenced in this case, an officer is even more likely to
frighten a person into committing an intervening crime when he enters the person's home
than when he detains the person on the street.
16

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's decision to deny Earl's motion to
suppress evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
SUBMITTED this 7** day of July, 2003.

L^STsEPPf
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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